What are philosophical problems?

The question is remarkably easy, but the irony is that the question itself is a philosophical problem.

‘What are philosophical problems?’ is a question about the nature of all philosophical problems. So the answer must define all philosophical problems. On the contrary, the definition separates philosophical problems from other problems.

Imagine a whole list of problems, that after thorough examination gives us this criteria, which holds for any philosophical problem:

• a philosophical problem is a problem that can not be scientifically observed, thus not be falsified

Now we have the common denominator of all philosophical problems. This wasn’t too hard.

There is one problem left. How do we know that the problems (used to distill the definition) are philosophical problems? Did we already qualify the examples and criteria as philosophical? How do we know our philosophical problems are actual philosophical problems?

At this point the feeling of driving a neverending roundabout emerges.

This feeling should emerge. Because we are at the heart of doubt. The question ‘how do we know that what we think it is, is what we think it is?’ doubts our very own nature, our capability of understanding. How can we understand when we don’t trust our own mind? Can’t our mind just be trusted?

Plato called everything we know an Idea, because concepts we understand exist in our mind. We don’t need the visible world to understand Ideas. In fact, the real world is elsewhere, our observations are merely shadows. Other philosophers obviously call this nonsense: what we observe is real, so we must doubt our mind and ideas.

But cannot both our mind and outside world be real? While you’re thinking about it, welcome to the philosophical problems.